This article explores two recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights and the French Cour de cassation respectively: SAS v France -a challenge to the French ban on the full-face covering in the public space and Baby Loup -in which a private nursery employee was dismissed for refusing to remove her non-face covering Islamic veil. This article demonstrates that whilst the two decisions share many features, the European Court of Human Rights only offers a semi-support to the French suspicions towards religion. Beyond French borders, the article argues that despite its flawed legal basis (the concept of living together) and its concerning use of proportionality tests, of discrimination protection and of margin of appreciation doctrine, the SAS judgment adopts a balanced approach which may pave the way for a less confrontational method of resolution of majority/minority conflicts over the place of religion in Europe.
On this 'infiltration', see the Government 'Trojan Horse' report, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340526/HC_576_access ible_-.pdf [last accessed 22 September 2014]. 6 For the latest non binding response on this issue, see Equality and Human Rights Commission's guidance on Gender Segregation, available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publication/gender-segregation-events-and-meetings-guidanceuniversities-and-students-unions [ -whether those views reflect religious ideals, a policy of equality or a commitment of disbelief. The hope -if ever entertained-that a moderate establishment constitutional arrangement such as has been adopted in Britain could ensure the peaceful nonlitigious co-existence of differing beliefs must therefore be revisited. This article will analyze the crucial teachings of the SAS case for laïc as well as for mainstream religious views in European countries. How can most widely shared views (in full or in part) be supported by the law in our era of religious diversity? Should they? The should radically transform the way that proportionality tests and discrimination protection operate in law. It does not explain either -more theoretically-why law should suddenly be reduced to reflecting social norms. However the SAS judgment also brings positive elements for future law and religion cases. The balanced appraisal of the interests at stake contrasts with the abstract and blanket assumptions present in prior case-law. In that respect the reasoning adopted by the Cour de cassation in Baby Loup appears obsolete. The blanket and abstract assumption, not based on evidence, that the Islamic non-face covering scarf would exercise pressure on young children's freedom of conscience no longer seems tenable.
I. LIVING TOGETHER: A FLAWED LEGAL BASIS
In SAS, the ECtHR recognized that the French veil ban interfered with the claimant's rights to express her personality (under article 8 ECHR) and her religious beliefs (under article 9 ECHR). However it then accepted that these infringements may be seen as necessary to ensure '(harmonious) living together', stating that: 'the barrier raised by a veil concealing the face could be perceived by the respondent State as breaching the minimum requirements of living together'. 11 Far from offering an enthusiastic endorsement of this new concept of "living together", the Court however immediately shows concerns about using such a malleable notion as a justification for restricting Convention rights. 12 Ultimately the notion of "living together" is adopted almost reluctantly, as a concession to the extremely covering nature of the prohibited garment and the wide margin of appreciation granted to France. The Court's caution towards this legal basis is understandable. The concept of living together in the context of burqa bans goes indeed beyond clearly identifiable threats to public order or public safety. It stretches to loose social expectations as to how to behave in society. 13 In the context of burqa bans, these social requirements would refer to the duty to engage to some degree into social interaction with fellow citizens. Wearing the full veil could be seen as violating these basic social duties in that the wearer would give her religious identity absolute priority over her identity as a citizen and refuse all interaction with fellow members of society. Such reasoning is problematic.
Even if it were established that women who wear the burqa in France do not in fact 11 ECtHR 1 July 2014 SAS v France, supra n 2, paras 121 and 122. 12 Ibid, para 122. 13 At first sight, it might therefore appear natural and reasonable for the ECtHR in the SAS case to rely -in the footsteps of the French Conseil Constitutionnel-15 on the minimum requirements of living together in order to assess the legitimacy of the French ban on the full-face veil. In the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the French bill and to which the Court refers, the wearing of the burqa was described as contrary to the French ideals of fraternity 16 and the rules of civility. Hindering social interaction, the concealment of the face was characterized as running counter to the Republican social covenant on which French society is founded. Assuming for now that a wide discretion may legitimately be granted to those French distinctive views, those statements would suggest that the French ideal of fraternity has a legal 14 In SAS, the applicant on the contrary alleged that she did not systematically wear the niqab. She declared that she was content not to wear the niqab at all times but wished to be able to wear it when she chose to do so, depending in particular on her spiritual feelings. content. The purpose of this section is to unravel and criticize the automatic transferthrough the use of the concept of "living together" as justification for the French burqa ban -of the social goals of a unified/harmonized public space to the legal realm. This process may be criticized on two levels: contextually, it betrays the roots of French republicanism. Conceptually, it adopts an impoverished and ethically deficient conception of law as a whole.
A. An Erroneous Conception of French Republicanism
The SAS judgment (in the wake of the French Conseil constitutionnel's reasoning) 17 may be criticized for blurring the distinction between a laïc State and a laïc society. Undeniably the regulation of religious symbols in the streets is both a social and a legal question and undeniably social reactions to these questions will be shaped by the legal environment. In France the issue is inevitably tainted by the laïc framework even when the concept of laïcité, generally taken to mean the separation of By severing the links between citizenship and the State, the SAS judgment thus betrays French republican traditions. While respect for tradition has no legal legitimacy as such, this particular distortion is problematic because it leaves dominant views unchecked and individual liberties at the mercy of the majority's good will.
Indeed the Republicanism that emerges from the SAS case is one that relies on social consensus. According to the reasoning adopted by the ECtHR in SAS, common values become explicitly part of the problem (as they now openly stand in conflict with the offending minority practice) and yet also form the solution (as they define the content of the elusive concept of the minimum requirements of living together 
B. Proportionality Tests and Anti-Discrimination Provisions

Misconstrued
Confronted by the growing presence or power of religion in the public sphere, 68 Law may be torn between protecting the voice of the religious few and strengthening dominant positions. In its appealing simplicity, 69 laïcité pretends to avoid the dilemma, giving no one any (religious) voice but everyone a say, as citizen.
But even assuming that laïcité can thus side-line the tensions, it is not (and should not), as demonstrated in the preceding section, be of universal application in both the 67 See also, in support of such assessment, the nuanced case-by-case approach adopted by the ECtHR in litigation opposing Churches and religious organizations to their employees. Similar facts -adultery committed by an employee in contradiction to the employer' ethos-may lead to differing assessments depending on whether the employee in question had a high and public profile in the organization, and occupation and is indirectly discriminatory, it will have to be justified under article 4(1) of Directive. The discriminatory measure will need to satisfy proportionality requirements in two respects: it will need to be adjusted to the specific activities and tasks undertaken by the employees concerned as well as attuned to the legitimate objective it seeks to attain. Despite these stringent tests, the restrictions on religious freedoms imposed by the employer in Baby Loup and by the State in SAS were upheld. The following paragraph will criticize this outcome.
In SAS, the protection afforded by the Directive was not available. The ban on the burqa applied outside employment and occupational requirements and therefore fell outside the scope of the Directive. Notwithstanding the non-applicability of the 70 It is arguable that proportionality requirements should also apply within the limits of laïcité but the argument falls outside the scope of this article. 71 For a plea in favour of a more robust use of proportionality requirements in law and religion cases, There is no doubt that the ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for 72 Allegations of violations of other articles were dismissed. These include allegations of violations of article 3 (right to be protected against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment); article 10 (right to freedom of expression) and article 11 (right to free assembly). 
A. Balanced and Nuanced Reasoning
The side of the public/private law divide; the employee's claim relates to the freedom to manifest (rather than to hold) religious beliefs; the case raises a conflict between the employee's right to manifest her religious faith in the workplace and children's freedom of conscience. Based on this dichotomous presentation, several conclusions followed. As an employer operating fully in the private sector, Baby Loup could not invoke laïcité but had to justify any restrictions on employees' religious freedoms in light of proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions. Because the restriction merely affected freedoms to manifest religious beliefs, leaving employees free to hold these religious beliefs, discrimination protection was then however side-stepped.
Finally, because the manifestation of religion was said to conflict with children's freedom of conscience, the restriction imposed by the employer was held to be justified and proportionate. As demonstrated above, the public/private law divide may not be entirely convincing but the outcome it generated in Baby Loup is to be people may still be free to hold the beliefs whose expression is thus restrained is naturally no justification. If it were, religious manifestation would indeed no longer be protected at all. By relying on the distinction between the forum internum and forum externum as it did, the Cour de cassation was reflecting French suspicions towards the visible presence of religion in the public sphere, but unduly narrowed human rights and anti-discrimination protections. pursued (the protection of laïcité) and the infringement caused to the individual claimant. 106 Would an artificial appeal to the concept of laïcité thus always allow
France to escape the Court's scrutiny? The Bayrak case led observers to think so. But the SAS judgement on the other hand suggests that abstract references to concepts will no longer be systematically upheld. In relation to gender equality, the ECtHR in SAS thus rejects the argument that the burqa necessarily oppresses women. Abstract assumptions about a practice cannot systematically prevail over its concrete individual meanings (para 119). It is self-defeating to purport to promote women's dignity and equality by prohibiting the autonomous personal decisions that some women make.
Had laïcité been invoked in support of the ban, the ECtHR could similarly have In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine in more depth why Moreover should a broad margin of appreciation legitimately be recognised, it
should not confer onto the respondent State a complete leeway in decision-making.
As in Lautsi, 113 the ECtHR in SAS seems to use the concept of margin of appreciation to justify a retreat of human rights protection in the light of intense political pressure.
In an age of subsidiarity, 114 the democracy-enhancing approach that the Court now seems keen to promote may help bring rights home 115 and satisfy eternal questions as to the Court's legitimacy. The risk is however that in the most high profile cases, national choices will be allowed to trump individual human rights for the sole reason that they have stirred intense national debate and obtained domestic political support.
Minority rights would then be at the mercy of political tactics. In SAS, the ECtHR adds another factor however to these political considerations: the important role of the face in social interaction (para 122).
The non-violation ruling in respect of the French burqa ban is thus unlikely to be extended to Baby Loup-type restrictions which apply to all religious garmentsface and non-face concealing alike-and which reflect choices made by the employer rather than a national choice of society. The margin of appreciation and public political dimension that allow for such acknowledgment of French (majority) choices thus reassuringly preclude from transferring similar choices in purely horizontal ahead-burka-ban-following-EU-rulingFrench-restrictions-legal.html [ It is therefore to be hoped that, in future cases, the ECtHR will both confirm its novel nuanced and fact-sensitive approach and change its current use of proportionality tests and unconvincing appeal to the margin of appreciation doctrine or to the concept of living together. The Court should take proportionality tests more seriously and resort to the margin of appreciation doctrine more cautiously. Instead of 'blurring the standards to be met by those seeking to limit the enjoyment of rights', 122 by a dubious recourse to political and sociological considerations, the Court would thus ensure greater clarity and fairness in law and religion cases across Europe. 
